"immoral," "overly fond of men," or those with "a reputation for promiscuity," he conducted extensive research among i nmates in his facility, and traveled to s tates with more liberal policies.8 Eventually, Priddy began sterilizing women inmates in the Virginia S tate Colony under his own interpretation of a 1916 Virginia law that allowed surgery designed to benefit the "physical, mental or moral" condition of inmates.9
Over time, D r. Priddy's overreaching brought him trouble. Along with a state probation officer, Priddy focused on the M allory family, a poor family with many children and a history of struggling with work, alcoholism, and domestic violence.!O Priddy arranged to have the mother and two daughters, ages fifteen and thirteen, committed to the Virginia Colony on the grounds of hereditary mental deficiency. " It took several weeks for M r. M allory to learn what had happened. Then he and his family immediately began to petition for their release. Mrs. Mallory was sterilized by the time Mr. M allory secured a l awyer and sued D r. Priddy and the Virginia Colony.12 The lawsuit, which voided the detention of the Mallory girls and justi fied Mrs. M allory's sterilization only on the grounds of a "medical emergency," rather than on the broader eugenic grounds invoked by the defense, convinced Priddy of the need for clearer legal mandates in order to proceed with his plan for eugenic sterilization.13
In reworking Virginia law to permit eugenic sterilization, D r. Priddy found an ally in the idealistic eugenics proponent, Harry Laughlin, who had drafted "A Model S terilization Law" in 1914.14 By 19�20, Laughlin was regarded as an international expert in eugenic sterilization.15 Two years later, he published his "Eugenical S terilization in the United S tates," which contained his Model Law.16 In I921, Priddy joined forces with Aubrey Strode, the attorney for the S tate Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded, who worked with him to lobby for the law's passage in the Virgin ia General Assembly.17 The Virginia S terilization Act of 1924 was drafted by Aubrey S trode; parts of it copied almost verbatim parts of Laughlin's Model Act.18 8.
/d. at 61.
9·
Lombardo, supra note I, at 60. 
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The Virginia Sterilization Act of 1924 illustrates the twin rationales eugenics advocates, such as Priddy, Strode, and Laughlin, promoted in support of eugenic policies. First, they asserted that sterilization was truly humane for the individual concerned. Second, they convinced others that the welfare of their community, their state, and indeed the country would be enhanced if specific classes of individuals did not bear children. The Act's "procedural safeguards," mandatory after the Mallory case, provided that if a superintendent of a state hospital or the State Colony for Epileptics and the Feebleminded is "of the opinion that it is for the best interests of the patients and of society" to sterilize an inmate, he may do so as long as he complies with the Act's requirements.'9 These requirements included petitioning the given institution's board of directors, serving the inmate's legal guardian with the petition, and convening a special board to hear the petition and other allowed forms of legal evidence, including the inmate's commitment papers and depositions. At the special board, all parties were entitled to legal counsel. The superintendent or the inmate could appeal the special board decision to the circuit court, then to the Supreme Court of Appeals. The Act also provided that "neither any of said superintendents nor any other person legally participating in the execution of the provisions of this act shall be liable either civilly or criminally on account of said participation." Here was the protection against l itigation Priddy had sought after his loss in the Mallory case.
The world Lombardo describes in this part of his history was in many ways smaller than our own. In the end, its intimacy enabled sterilization proponents to orchestrate the passage of Virginia's law and to ensure it would withstand legal challenge. The interconnected nature of the community of advocates of state-sponsored sterilization included Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, author of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Buck v. Bell. As Lombardo points out in his fi rst chapter, Justice Holmes' father, the famous poet and essayist, wrote an extended essay about heredity, "moral idiocy," and the "deep-rooted moral defects" criminals passed to their offspring.20 Justice Holmes echoed his father's beliefs when writing the opinion for Buck v. Bell. her m other, and her daughter were not "imbeciles." Instead, they were poor women who were vulnerable to coercion and abuse at the hands of others, including the state.
To dismiss the opinion outright is too easy, though. Instead, it is worth probing the extent to which Holmes' sense of the relationship between the individual and the state has any l ingering validity. Holmes' opinion rests upon two policy-based arguments. First, he concludes that some individuals are so ill-suited for parenthood that they should not be permitted to become parents. He predicates this determination on the grounds that their offspring are destined to become burdens on the state." Second, he argues that, because the state may require soldiers to sacrifi ce their lives on i ts behalf, it must a fortiori be permitted to require lesser sacrifices, including sterilization, of others.'3 Both of these arguments merit consideration prior to dismissal. The first is easy to fault on grounds of ambiguity. Precisely which individuals are to be considered ill-suited for parenthood? And even if it were possible to identify a class of individuals incapable of rearing children, what is the metric by which the state is to judge the extent to which their offspring are l ikely to become burdens? Holmes' opinion rests heavily on now-discredited faith in genetic inheritance, and the assumption that a relatively unintelligent mother will produce a relatively unintelligent child.
O ne can ridicule Holmes' misplaced faith in eugenics, and yet, one also can fi nd vestiges of it in con temporary social policies pertaining to reproduction. Virginia's sterilization law was neither the fi rst nor the last attempt by a government to influence its citizens' child-bearing decisions.'4 S terilization is the most extreme of such policies, to be sure, and Lombardo provides a detailed account of the contemporaneous laws in other states and nations that advanced government-supported or government-mandated sterilization.'5 But there are myriad less overt examples of government policies that attempt to encourage or discourage reproduction. Sometimes these policies are indirect, as in tax deductions or child allowances, which might encourage reproduction, or welfare policies that might discourage childbearing by capping the amount of state support for poor women .'6 Some policies are less subtle in their intent. 24. See discussion infra Part ilL!.
25. See, e.g., Lombardo, supra note I, at 20 (regarding medical experimentation on men and women in institutions); id. at 239-40 (regarding experimental sterilization programs in the U.S.); id. at 248 (regarding the "massive sterilization" of Native Americans at Indian Health Services facilities throughout the U.S.). A more detailed discussion of these policies is found below. See irifra section II, C Race & Eugenics. Consider, for instance, premarital testing laws and policies, which often are designed to discourage reproduction by those whose offspring might bear a disproportionately high risk of abnormality. 2)
Buck v. Bell's second assertion-that a government claiming the right to conscript soldiers into mortal combat surely has the right to demand lesser sacrifices from its citizens-is not as readily dismissed. Holmes surely is right in noting the hypocrisy of claiming a government has no right to demand non-life-threatening or "lesser" physical sacrifi ces from its citizens, while at the same time maintaining a mandatory draft. Living i n an era of voluntary conscription, we might ignore his challenge. The fact of the matter is that we live today with this hypocrisy.
For example, in the name of public health, the government is empowered to and in fact does make demands of citizens."s State governments typically require children to receive certain vaccinations prior to matriculation into public schools."9 Some states have implemented policies collecting corneas from cadavers-a policy designed to enhance the supply of corneas available for transplantation, a procedure routinely required by a significant percentage also id. at 242 (describing a 1956 bill proposed in Virginia, which would have allowed public welfare officials to initiate sterilization proceedings against women who had given birth to more than one illegitimate child).
27. !d. at 46 (noting that laws requiring testing for syphilis or other conditions that affected fertility were routinely labeled "eugenic marriage laws" of the population.3° Even though the extractions involve cadavers rather than living citizens, the cornea extraction laws and their "presumed consent" provisions have seen their fair share of controversy.3'
In spite of the broad public health powers given to states by the U.S. Constitution,32 proposals to curtail individual rights in the name of protecting the general welfare remain relatively rare and are met with great resistance. For instance, proposals to increase the organ supply by creating a presumption in favor of donation with opportunities to opt out, as opposed to the present policy, which requires solicitation of next of kin, have been universally rejected.33 Nor has there been any significant support for creating mandatory universal bone marrow typing programs, although it is clear that bone marrow donations can save lives, that they are relatively harmless to the donor, and that the only barrier to saving more lives is the limited number of "matching" donors currently registered as volunteers.34 From a public health perspective, Holmes' O p miOl1 is well-grounded in federal and state constitutional law. And yet, the reality seems to be that the government today makes relatively minor express demands of its citizens' bodies, virtually always providing an opportunity for them to object and exempt themselves. For instance, the extent to which suggestions that it was time to re-impose a universal draft, triggered by the unpopular U. S. war in Iraq, were met with scorn, silence, and eye-rolling); As Lombardo discusses in his epilogue, one further legacy of Buck v. Bell is to force us to question the extent to which we actually are willing to empower our governmen t to pursue communitarian goals when they conflict with individual liberty.36 C. Theme Three: Lawyers Behaving Badly Lombardo's book reveals a treasure trove of professionalism questions for lawyers. To begin with, he unveils significant chumminess, if not outright collusion, among the professionals involved in the case. The "teamwork" started before Carrie Buck was identified as a potential candidate for sterilization, but nowhere was it more troubling than in the manner in which the lawyers for the state, the defense, and the judges worked together to insure the law would be upheld and Carrie would be sterilized. I n Chapters 8 through 12, Lombardo chronicles the depth and extent of the collaboration between the key players behind Buck v. Bell.
As The story of state-sponsored sterilization also may be seen as an example of doctors sacrificing their professional integrity by forming alliances with the state. Obviously, the sterilization laws could not have been implemented without doctors willing to work with the state to purge the population of the threat it saw in the reproductive capacity of a subset of its population . A student of health law, and in particular of public health law, should have little trouble seeing eugenics programs as familiar when considered in the context of other instances of moral panic. In the name of promoting the best interests of their patients and their country, health care professionals have participated in dubious medical endeavors throughout h istory and today-torture and medical experiments carried out upon uninformed or non-consenting individuals, testing pregnant women for evidence of substance abuse without first obtaining informed consent, and participating in executions, just to mention a few.48 47-Id. at 786-90.
48. An example of doctors participating in non-consensual, racially discriminatory drug tests of predom inately poor, black women just after they gave birth occurred at the provides an excellent illustration of public choice theory at work at the i ntersection of public policy, private health, and the law. Public choice theory emerged in the 195os, in an effort to apply the tools of microeconomics to the analysis of governmental actionsY Generally speaking, public choice theorists demonstrate the manner in which self-interest can lead to distortions in the political process. This happens when a coalition seeking some specifi c advantage devotes their resources to rally the state into action, and succeeds because their concentrated interests are more readily perceived by legislators than are the diffuse opposing interests of the general citizenry.
Lombardo's account demonstrates the ongoing presence of opponents to eugenics throughout the decades in question. In Chapter 4, Lombardo recoun ts the doctors, geneticists, committees, and lawmakers whose outspoken and robust opposition to eugenics yielded successful campaigns against steril ization laws. For example, critics of Harry Laughlin decried his research with the Eugenics Records Office as anecdotal at bestY The lack of concrete data on the "therapeutic benefit" to those targeted by sterilization "U.S. military doctors grossly violated medical ethics by participating in acts in violation of international treaties on human rights." She cites Robert Jay Lifton, a Harvard Medical School psychiatrist and author of a book on Nazi doctors, who described the prison as a situation in which "doctors and other medical personnel were part of a command structure that permitted, encouraged, and sometimes orchestrated torture to a degree that it became the norm-with which they were expected to comply.") .
49. See, e.g., Lombardo, supra note I, at 20 (discussing Nazi medical experiments); !d. at 239-40 (discussing medical experiments in U.S. institutions and asylums). The success Harry Laughlin and others achieved in Virginia provides a classic example of how a small n umber of deeply committed individuals can shift public policy to their desired end, provided the opposition is generalized and sufficiently diffuse that it can be outlasted or worn down.58 By the time Virginia passed its law, at least eleven other states had considered and rejected or repealed similar laws.59 Of course, it is also possible that the relative success of pro-eugenic forces is attributable to issues of gender, race, class, and disability. Opponents of sterilization laws might have been less likely to protest given the identity of those targeted by the laws-poor residents of state facilities for the mentally disabled.
E '!heme Six: Comparative Law, Population Policies, and Eugenics
Chapters 15 and I7 of Lombardo's book establish the ties between u.s. proponents of eugenics policies and their German counterparts. The first of these chapters describes the evolution of eugenics in Germany as a public health measure.60 I t also illustrates the manner in which intellectual collaboration led to surprisingly similar policy formulation in the early decades of the 20th century in both the U.S. and Germany.61 In Chapter I 7 , Lombardo discusses the demise of the popular embrace of eugenics occasioned by the Nuremberg trials and the exposure of broad-scaled sterilization campaigns carried out by the Nazis against Jews and other sub-populations they deemed The exposure and public condemnation of Nazi sterilization practices did not lead the U.S. Supreme Court, or state courts or legislatures for that matter, to reconsider their stance in favor of sterilization of the "feebleminded."64 I nstead, the surgeries con tinued, but at a slower pace, and according to Lombardo, public consciousness and concern over the composition of the U.S. population moved from sterilization to policies governing out-of-wedlock births and mixed-race marriages.65
Lombardo moves on to tell the story of Buck v. Bell's rediscovery in the late I970S and early 1980s, and of the effort made by ACLU lawy ers to obtain legal redress for those who had been victims of non-consensual sterilization.66 This s tory provides a necessary denouement for the central topic of his book-the story of Carrie B uck and the law. It is by no means the end of the story of government efforts to regulate the reproduction of its citizenry. Instead, it serves as an excellent jumping off point for those interested in exploring both past and present population policies around the world.
In my Spring 2009 seminar, entitled "Government Regulation of Reproduction," we used Lombardo's chapters on German policy to launch a discussion of the perceived "population explosion" that motivated policies such as India's "Sterilization Emergency" in the late 1970s, and that continues to animate China's one-child policy.6; We discussed the extent to which U. S. In the '970s, the government of I ndia established mass sterilization camps. They still exist today, with some of the same abuses and poor conditions: health conditions are substandard, financial incentives are offered to both sterilization recruiters and clients, and most villages are obligated to fill sterilization quotas. Seventy percent of all couples using modern birth control methods rely on sterilization, with the woman usually being the one who is sterilized. Because vasectomies were the focus of the greatest coercion in the '970s, vasectomy rates have dropped. Women now bear the responsibility of the sterilizations in India, even though the risks are greater for women than men.
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foreign aid fuels population policies around the world, including those in Africa, which remains the continent with the world's highest birth rates. In addition, we explored endeavors to promote population growth by nations worried about declining birth rates and the aging of their population. By situating our discussion in contemporary cultures facing real problems with poverty, women's rights, access to care, and inequality, the world of Carrie Buck suddenly seemed a good deal more familiar and less readily dismissed as "ancient history" than it had earlier in the term.
II. Gender, Race, Class, Crime, and Fertility Regulation A second set of themes emerging from Lombardo's chronicle of Buck v. Bell and eugenics in the U. S. involves the gender, race, and class of those targeted by the sterilization laws. Lombardo's research points to the disproportionate impact these laws had on those whose social standing rendered them vulnerable. Typically, they were women, almost always poor women, and quite often also women of color. Indeed, it is difficult to separate out the strands of gender, class, race, and crime when considering both the history and contemporary government efforts to shape reproductive patterns. I n this section, I brieRy discuss each of these factors, noting the ways in which membership in each group, let alone in more than one of these groups, rendered one vulnerable. Following this, I discuss the manner in which the social vulnerability of those targeted by sterilization laws permitted the laws to expand beyond their original moorings in eugenics to embrace a more frankly punitive policy.
A. Theme Seven: Gender and Sterilization Laws
From the perspective of gender, Lombardo's rendition of Carrie B uck's story serves as a particularly vivid reminder of the manner in which doctors and governments have appropriated women's bodies, and in particular their reproductive capacity, in pursuit of purportedly salutary ends. The history of the medical profession's disregard of women's bodily autonomy stretches back hundreds of years, and persists in a variety of guises even today.68 A brief list of examples might include the remarkable history of non-consensual medical experimentation on pregnant women,69 the efforts of psychiatrists to , for a discussion of the betrayal of fiduciary duty inherent in these cases.
See, e.g., Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp 7'3 ('978), a class action lawsuit brought by more than ',000 women who received diethylstilbestrol (DES) in the 1950S as part of their prenatal care at the University of Chicago's teaching hospital. Doctors gave the women DES as part of a clinical trial sponsored by the manufacturer to determine whether DES prevented miscarriages. Until almost two decades later, the women did not know that they label as mentally ill women who sought to pursue occupations other than as housewives and mothers,7° and more recent policies focused on the detection and punishment of women who ingest illicit substances during pregnancy)'
Lombardo's book enables the reader to situate Carrie B uck's sterilization and the eugenics movement of the early 20th century in the broad context of this history. It was no accident that Carrie, a young woman, was chosen as the test case for upholding the Virginia law)' Indeed, it was her gender that brought her to the state institution in the fi rst place. Prior to her institutionalization in Virgin ia's Colony for Epileptics and the Feebleminded, she had lived with a foster family. She was placed in foster care when she was approximately three years old, after her father died and her mother was deemed incapable of caring for herself and her children )3 As a child, Carrie attended school and seems to have participated fully and normally in her foster family's household.
Things changed when Carrie became pregnant after a sexual encounter with her fos ter parents' nephew. 74 Although she described this encounter as non·consensual-a rape-no report was filed with the police. When her foster paren ts realized what had happened, they brought her to the state institution for the feebleminded./5 Her status as an unmarried pregnant teenager, coupled with their testimony about her behavior, was sufficient evidence to have her admitted. Their nephew's repu tation was protected. The harm done to Carrie had been multiplied, but her degradation was not yet complete.
Once she became a resident of the state facility, without a family who might protest on her behalf and newly delivered of her child, Carrie was identifi ed as an ideal candidate for the first sterilization under Virginia's new law. Supporters of the law knew it would be challenged, and they consciously selected the first sterilization case with an eye to that challenge. There was little chance that, in removing Carrie's capacity for reproduction, the state might trigger had received DES or that they were part of a clinical trial. 
B. Theme Eight: Class and Eugenics
Of equal importance in rendering Carrie Buck the ideal test case for Virginia's sterilization law was the fact that she was poor, and cut off from the resources that might have enabled her to challenge the state's actions against her. As with gender, there is a long history of government-sponsored efforts to control the reproductive lives of the poor. Those in power tend to perceive a threat in the capacity of the poor to grow and multiply. Indeed, the Old Testament's account of Pharaoh's order to kill the newborn sons of Hebrew slaves reflects these fears and might be seen as an early eugenics policy of sorts )7
In the U.S., anxiety on the part of both the government and private social service organizations served to fuel eugenics-based policies designed to curb the number of children born to poor mothers. Some of these efforts were direct, such as sterilization laws that targeted residents of public institutions. More often, though, efforts to limit reproduction among the poor were indirect. For instance, consider the rhetoric employed by Margaret Sanger, the founder of Planned Parenthood and a tireless campaigner on behalf of legalizing birth control . Although ultimately it seems she was motivated by the desire to improve the health of poor women, she often predicated her support for 76. This point is driven home forcefully by Lombardo's revelation that Dr. Arthur Estabrook, the expert whose testimony regarding Carrie Buck's "moral degeneracy" justified the state's decision to sterilize her, had a history of extramarital affairs and financial fraud-conduct easily exceeding any "moral degeneracy" manifested by Carrie Buck. !d. at 182-84. Even more ironic and to the point is the fact that Harry Laughlin developed epilepsy, a condition that would have made him a target for sterilization under the very law he worked to pass. !d. at 2I3-14.
n The Old Testament Book of Exodus, Chapter I, verses 8-16, tells the following story: Now there arose a new king over Egypt, who knew not Joseph. And he said unto his people: "Behold, the people of the children of Israel are too many and too mighty for us; come, let us deal wisely with them, lest they multiply, and it come to pass, that, when there befalleth us any war, they also join themselves unto our enemies, and fight against us, and get them up out of the land." Therefore they did set over them taskmasters to affiict them with their burdens. And they built for Pharaoh store-cities, Pithom and Raamses. But the more they affiicted them, the more they multiplied and the more they spread abroad . . . . And the king of Egypt spoke to the Hebrew midwives, of whom the name of the one was Shiphrah, and the name of the other Puah; and he said: "When ye do the office of a midwife to the Hebrew women, ye shall look upon the birthstool: if it be a son, then ye shall kill him; but if it be a daughter, then she shall live." Exodus Chapter I, http://www.mechon·mamre.orgie/et/et020I .htm (last visited 2/2512009) '
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legalizing contraception upon her fears of the consequences of "unchecked breeding" among poor immigrants to the U.S.78 For instance, one of her early pamphlets read:
I t is a vicious cycle; ignorance breeds poverty and poverty breeds ignorance.
There is only one cure for both, and that is to stop breeding these things.
S top bringing to birth children whose inheritance cannot be one of health or intelligence. Stop bringing into the world children whose parents cannot provide for them.79
A We must intensify efforts to reach these communities with needed screening and treatment services. Testing and the knowledge of infection is a critical first step toward reducing the continued consequences of these diseases.").
the heightened risk of infertility inherent in these numbers, suggest an urgent need for policy interventions in order to protect poor women of color from infertility. I ndeed, were the government truly concerned about the implications of these disparities, one would expect it to promote access to all manner of treatments associated with preserving and promoting this population's ability to bear children. Nonetheless, suggestions that government-sponsored health care plans for the poor should include treatment for infertility have been greeted by derision even from well-known liberal legislators such as the late Senator Edward Kennedy.s3 Given the acknowledged barriers to health care experienced by poor Americans, in conjunction with the refusal to consider funding infertility treatments, one might wonder whether there is an implicit eugenic policy in the failure to devise health care interventions to encourage the early detection and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases.
C. 77zerne Nine: Race and Eugenics
Although Carrie Buck was a poor white woman, the eugenics movement that ensnared her was, in reality, disproportion ally concerned with regulating the reproductive lives of women of color. Because the bulk of his book is devoted to telling Carrie's story, Lombardo only occasionally notes the deep racism that infected, and many argue continues to affect, government reproduction-related policies.84 This is not to say that Lombardo views the racist implications of eugenics policy as a thing exclusively of the past. Indeed, toward the end of the book, Lombardo provides a telling reminder that " the class-based, racist eugenics of previous generations is not dead. "85 Lombardo recounts the 2004 congressional election in Tennessee, in which James Hart ran on a eugenic platform, advocating for a "war on poverty genes," namely those of the "African race. "86 83. For example, when Massachusetts paid for fertility drugs given to Medicaid patients on welfare, many of whom already had children, Senator Kennedy responded with "Our goal in using tax dollars wisely is to reduce welfare dependency, not create more of it." Ellen Goodman, A Short Supply of Common Sense in Government-Funded Conception, The Boston Globe, March 20, 1994.
84. Lombardo discusses some proposals for race' based eugenics laws, as well as the discriminatory implementation of past sterilization laws. See, e.g., Lombardo, supra note I, at 27 (citing a California physician whose solution to the "Negro problem" was to enact a eugenics law similar to a 1911 New Jersey sterilization law); id. at 58 (discussing race as an issue during eugenics law proposals in 1907 Virginia, where one doctor called for the castration of black men who assaulted white women); id. at 158 (noting that former President William Howard Taft, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court during Buck v. Bell, rejected the "unsanity of racial prejudice" that characterized eugenics laws mandating racial separation); id. at 243 (including a section on Loving v. Virginia and how eugenics motives underscored anti· miscegenation laws); and id. at 248 (regarding the massive rates of sterilization performed on Native Americans at Indian Health Services facilities).
85· Lombardo, supra note I, at 275.
/d.
In considering how to explore the racist legacy and ongoing relevance of eugenics in contemporary policies, one might well turn to the history of U. S. immigration policy.8) This history is rich material for those either curious about, or perhaps ignorant of the manner in which the U. S. government has attempted and still attempts to shape the composition of its population. Because I covered much of this material in considering contemporary comparative population policies,88 when teaching my seminar, I elected to engage in a more straightforward examination of the ways in which race intersects with eugenics policies, beginning in the early 20th century. Dorothy Roberts' 1997 book, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction and the Meaning qf Liberty, is one of the richest explorations of the long history of eugenic and quasi-eugenic policies that have regulated the lives of poor black women in the U.S.89 In her book, Roberts traces social policies governing the reproductive lives of black women to the era of slavery. I t is almost too painful to consider the human torment inherent i n policies that treated female slaves as breeders, sanctioning the forcible removal and sale of their offspring, whether conceived in rape, in forced breeding, or perhaps in love. But those who wish to understand the hubris of American eugenics cannot afford to ignore this h istory, as it is the unvarnished prologue to much of what has followed.
Slavery "marked [b J lack women from the beginning as objects whose decisions about reproduction should be subject to social regulation rather than to their own will."90 Roberts argues that one might see later policies, such as those advanced by the birth control and eugenic movements of the early I90os, as direct descendents of slavery's attitude toward black women.91 Several other scholars advance similar arguments with regard to contemporary policies governing reproduction, particularly those governing perinatal substance abuse and access to assisted reproductive technology. 91. Roberts is cautious in tying early birth control reformers to the strictly racist policies of early eugenicists. For example, although Roberts criticized Margaret Sanger, the strongest feminist advocate for birth control in the early part of the 20th century, for her eventual alliance with certain eugenic interests, she ultimately dismisses the charge that Sanger was a racist: " I t appears that Sanger was motivated by a genuine concern to improve the health of the poor mothers she served rather than a desire to eliminate their stock." /d. at 81. the time of their earliest contact, Native Americans were relentlessly pursued and many individuals murdered; entire tribes were forcibly relocated from their homes and their land was stolen.93 For many years, the federal B ureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) operated health clinics in which Native American women were subjected to forced sterilization.94 Accounts of these forced sterilizations indicate that the women who did consent often did so under duress: they were provided inaccurate medical information and even threatened with the loss of health services or welfare benefits.95 Nor were these policies ancient history. Medical records show that as recently as the 1970s, the B IA-operated Indian Health Service Hospital in Claremore, Oklahoma was rou tinely performing sterilization procedures on Native American women without obtaining a thorough informed consent.96
See
O nce one situates governmen tal reproduction-related policies and race in historical context, the through-line linking these policies to contemporary efforts to regulate the reproductive l ives of women of color is readily apparen t. For instance, consider the manner in which the criminal justice system has responded to public health problems stemming from perinatal substance abuse. Long after being discredited on medical and public health grounds, criminal justice officials have persisted in prosecuting "pregnant addicts," focusing on public hospitals used disproportion ally by poor women of color who use street drugs.97 The effort to cast substance abuse by pregnant women as a crime flies in the face of virtually all contemporary literature by medical and public health experts, who note, first, that the focus on drugs m isses the equally, if not more menacing, harm posed to fetuses by alcohol and/or prescription drug abuse, and, further, that the threat of prosecution drives women away from the health care system, rather than encouraging them to see it as a resource for securing healthier outcomes for themselves and for their fetuses.98 Criminalization of perinatal substance abuse, according to Professor Roberts, must be seen as part of a "continuing legacy of the degradation of [bJ lack motherhood. "99
Professor Roberts argues that anxiety about black mothers and their babies has motivated contemporary policies as diverse as welfare regulations, the criminalization of substance abuse by pregnant women, and mandatory sterilization . These policies, Roberts explains, ultimately rest upon and reinforce " the twin assumptions that the problem of [bJlack poverty can be cured by lowering [bJlack birthrates and that [bJlack women's bodies are an appropriate site for this social experiment." 'oo As Roberts explains, prosecution and criminalization are part of a larger and long-term social tendency to devalue black mothering. This tendency draws upon and reinforces dominant ideals of motherhood, which include ideas about who is and who is not fi t to be a mother, and about whose offspring are a social benefit and whose are not. As we have seen throughout history, such ideals may explicitly or tacitly inform a host of eugenic policies.
D. Theme Ten: Crime, Reproduction, and Expanding Eugenics to Criminals
As is true with many other things, a little bit of scientifi c knowledge can cause a great deal of harm. This truism was borne out as proponents of sterilization for the "mentally deficient" began to advocate for a more broadly scaled use of sterilization on behalf of improving the human race. In the spirit of quasi science that already infused eugenics policies, the years following passage of the Virginia sterilization statute saw a demand for sterilization that went well 98. Numerous publications have demonstrated that crack addiction, which triggered the initial wave of prosecutions of pregnant women, is and remains today both less prevalent and more racially diverse than portrayed by the media. See, e.g., Laura E. Gomez, Misconceiving Mothers: Legislators, Prosecutors, and the Politics of Prenatal D rug Exposure (Temple University Press 1997). Moreover, media reports and policy makers alike ignored the many other causes of fetal harm, which include alcohol, tobacco, poverty, poor health, domestic violence, and poor nutrition. In view of these factors, crack cocaine usage certainly is not the only substance, nor even the primary substance, that poses a threat to fetal wellbeing. As Roberts suggests in Killing the Black Body, drug addiction often occurs in such a complex context that it is exceedingly difficult to determine what precisely impairs a fetus: "Researchers cannot tell us which of this array of hazards actually caused the terrible outcomes they originally attributed to crack." Roberts, supra note 89, at '58.
99. Roberts, supra note 89, at 153-54 (noting that in Charleston, South Carolina alone, "all but one of four dozen women arrested for prenatal crimes in Charleston were [bJlack" [d.
I I I .
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942).
Finding flaws in the Skinner decision is almost as easy as finding flaws in Buck v. Bell. (Was Skinner really a "habitual criminal"? If so, was there any reason to believe his criminal behavior derived from his genetic makeup, and was capable of being transmitted to his offspring?) . But despite its acknowledgement of the statute's seemingly weak factual foundation, the Court took issue only with the due process violations imposed on Skinner. The holding itself is ambiguous in that it is not clear whether the Court believed Skinner should have been permitted to advance evidence showing he actually had the potential to produce socially desirable offspring (and who knows what that means or how one would prove it) , or whether instead the court meant only that Skinner should have been permitted to argue that he did not intend to become a parent. O ther parts of the law (for example, the seemingly arbitrary list of crimes that trigger sterilization) , would have been permitted to stand. In dicta, for instance, the Court noted that it would not have second-guessed the state's use of its police power to single out the thief while protecting the embezzler."2 More interesting, though, is the morphing of eugenics from its original anchor in a mistaken understanding of genetic inheritance to a policy of state-based reproductive control unrelated to genetics. Although it struck the underlying law, the Supreme Court's opinion in Skinner foreshadowed a host of later criminal justice policies devaluing the reproductive capacity of felons. Consider, for example, the numerous cases conditioning probation or lenien t sentencing upon the convict's consent to use contraception or to be sterilized. "3 Sometimes judges suggest sterilization or contraception as a condition of probation for those convicted of crimes involving harming their own children . Although controversial because such conditions surely are not the least restrictive means of protecting an as-yet-to-be conceived child, one can at least follow the line of reasoning that leads the j udge to propose such a condition."4 Other times, however, the court's effort to curb reproduction among those whom they convict is utterly disconnected from the crime for which they have been convicted. For example, Lombardo includes the example of judges who offer men who have fallen seriously behind on child support payments the option of going to jail or having a vasectomy."5
III. The Regulation of Reproduction, or Eugenics in the 2Is' Century"6
As discussed throughout this essay, governmental regulation of reproduction can be accomplished directly or indirectly, via economic policies as well as by civil regulation and criminal laws. In this final section, I consider three manifestations of contemporary "eugenic" policies not necessarily touched upon in Lombardo's history, but plainly growing out of the rich foundation his work has laid: the contemporary market in human gametes, the development and incorporation of prenatal testing into standard prenatal care, and the regulation of sex and reproduction among developmentally disabled individuals. ("In California, some judges ordered female defendants to undergo sterilization as a condition of probation. I n one particularly notorious case, a twenty-one year old Latina was given the choice between jail time or probation conditional upon her sterilization. The crime, a misdemeanor, was being present in a room where her boyfriend was caught smoking marijuana. In addition to probation sentences, some women were coercively sterilized in order to obtain welfare benefits.").
n6. In recent decades, the word "eugenics" has come to have specific resonance with anti abortion advocates. There is much to be said about the extent to which such an analogy is apt or inapt. 
A. Theme Eleven: Eugenics and the Market in Human Gametes"7
The infertility industry has given rise to a thriving international market in the sale of gametes-human eggs and sperm . This market proliferates, to a great extent heedless of state and national efforts at regulation and standardization, owing largely to deep-seated beliefs regarding the significance of genetic endowment."s The first artificial insemination dates back to 1790 in Scotland; the first reported artificial insemination in the U.S. occurred in 1884."9 American doctors began using artificial insemination with donor sperm in the 1950S to help married couples in which the husband's sperm count was too low to permit conception.120 Originally, the focus on genetics tended to be limited to a concern with matching the donor's physical characteristics to those of the infertile husband-height, hair color, eye color, and ethnicity.121
At fi rst blush, the desire to produce a child who will resemble his non biological parent seems uncontroversial and almost innate. Parents often look for signs of themselves in their children; indeed some sociobiologists contend 1 17. One might easily expand this topic to include a discussion of the c1ass·based, dc-facto eugenics inherent in permitting free-market approaches to govern access and regulation of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) . At first blush, it seems that the challenge of paying for various forms of ARTs is no different from other market challenges facing those with limited resources. The eugenic side of this issue emerges when one considers the disparate impact of governmental non· regulation on two populations: gays and lesbians, and the poor. By definition, gays and lesbians need some intervention in order to have children. Many states do not permit same-sex couples to adopt or refuse to acknowledge adoptions permitted under the laws of other states. See Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My Mother?: Interstate Recognition of Adoptions by Gays and Lesbians, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. , (2008), for a breakdown of which states permit same-sex adoptions and which do not, and the Full Faith and Credit issues that arise when same·sex couples with adopted children travel interstate. Gays and lesbians would seem to be particularly likely consumers of assisted reproductive technologies, and yet, discrimination by private doctors may dissuade many from obtaining the assistance they need. Although she ultimately was victorious in court, the story of Guadalupe Benitez is illustrative of this point. See North Coast Women's Care Medical Group, I nc v. Superior Court, ,89 P'3d 959 (Cal. �w08) (upholding a lesbian patient's claim that her doctors violated state anti·discrimination laws by refusing to perform intrauterine insemination). The disparate impact of high-cost ARTs on the poor is self-evident, and yet, even their usual allies in Congress laugh at the thought that Medicaid might have an obligation to assist poor Americans in their desire to have genetically-linked offspring. See supra note 83 (regarding Senator Edward Kennedy's response to the proposition that Massachusetts should pay for fertility drugs given to Medicaid patients on welfare) . 12J. See Lamport, supra note 120, at 117.
SeegeneralfJ
7hirteen Utiys of Looking at Buck v. Bell that the impulse to reproduce derives at least in part from our yearning toward self-replication. I" Of course, it is impossible to guarantee whether any given sperm from a donor will in fact carry the specifi c traits desired by the recipient.123 Nonetheless, from the start, doctors and recipient families considered it desirable and sound practice to seek out sperm donors using assumptions about genetic inheritance.
It was a small leap from the practice of choosing physically similar sperm donors to buying oocy tes (human eggs) from young women with high SAT scores and specific talents, attributes, and accolades (e.g., athletic scholarships, musical talent, ethnic identity).124 College newspapers across the U.S. rou tinely run advertisements from infertile couples seeking oocy tes from particularly gi fted female students in the hopes that their genes will optimize their chances of producing a similarly gifted child.I'5 In spite of efforts by national regulatory organizations to cap payments, i t is clear that the market grades oocy tes according to the perceived value of the genes they bear.
Much has been written about the inherent race, class, and gender bias in the oocy te market.'26 Some would remedy these problems by standardizing or capping the prices women receive for their eggs; others would ban pay ments for human gametes altogether.'27 To date, however, li ttle effort has been made to rein in the market in human gametes, which proliferates in spite of the absence of scientific studies establishing the likelihood or the extent to which an offspring will possess her parents' non-phy sical traits. Although scientists understand the manner in which genetic inheritance controls the manifestation of single-gene traits, such as eye-color, or single-gene disorders such as Down sy ndrome or Huntington's disease, they are far from understanding how or whether traits such as intelligence or athletic ability are linked to genetics. At best, we can hypothesize that the extent to which a particular trait or ability manifests in a child results from a combination of genetics, environment and luck.'28 Indeed, according to Dr. Dennis Garlick, who analy zed 124 studies of the underly ing basis of intelligence, present scientific thinking suggests that intelligence is partially created, rather than wholly inherited.'29 Specifically, his review of available research supports a dy namic model, in which intelligence is not a static trait, inherited at conception, but rather, " . . . is created when neural connections in the brain are changed in response to environmental cues. "'30
It is this uncertainty about whether genetics matters that raises perhaps the most interesting questions to be asked about the relationship between eugenics and assisted reproductive technologies. Consider what we do and don't know. We know, for instance, that there are some negative short-term physical consequences for women who undergo ovarian stimulation in order to become a "donor. " We do not know very much about the long-term physical or psychological consequences of "donation." Although it might Psycho!. Rev. [ [ 6 (2002) (presenting the author's theory of "neural plasticity" to explain conflicting studies about intelligence, in order to reconcile data suggesting intelligence, although inherited, is also improved by one's environment).
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HeinOnline --59 J. Legal Educ. 385 [2009] [2010] Thirteen Wtzys if Looking at Buck v. Bell have seemed an obvious inquiry for scientists to pursue, twenty-plus years after the reproductive endocrinologists began using donor oocy tes, evidence regarding long-term psychological consequences remains mostly anecdotaI.l31 Likewise, we know little about the consequences for children conceived in this manner. Early studies suggest higher than average rates of low birth weight, birth defects, and neurological problems.132 Finally, we know little about the experiences of parents whose children are conceived using donor gametes. How do they respond to the traits their child manifests? What happens when the child they hoped would be a tall, brilliant athlete turns out to be a short child of below-average abilities?
These uncertainties surely shape the calculus for an individual or a couple contemplating using assisted reproductive technologies to have a child. The extent to which the market in human gametes proliferates is testament, then, to an unspoken faith in the signifi cance of a genetic link. I have seen evidence of this faith when I've asked students to consider which sort of infertility they think would be harder to endure, the inability to produce gametes, or the inability to carry a child to term? Invariably, the majority concludes they'd be more devastated by an inability to have a child who was "genetically their own" than they would be by the inability to become pregnant themselves.
I don't judge these students any more than I do prospective parents who choose to pursue a child with a particular genetic background, be it their own or one acquired from another. I too would have struggled had I faced similar choices. No matter how little we actually know about genetics and inheritance, no matter how ugly the history of eugenics, no matter how much we have internalized Freud and post-Freudian thinking about how parenting shapes the life experiences of offspring, I retain an abiding fai th that "who" we are is at least in part a manifestation of our parents' DNA. Beginning in the 1970S and 1980s, prenatal screening and genetic testing became a standard part of prenatal care. Health care providers began offering pregnant women of "advanced maternal age" (those age thirty-five or older) a series of tests, some invasive, some simply urine screens, designed to identify genetic abnormalities in their fetuses.'33 I ndeed, some states began to require all pregnant women be offered the least expensive of these screens-the maternal serum alpha-fetoprotein screen .134 These tests were incorporated into standard practice without much consideration of the impact they would have on the pregnant woman, her partner, her fetus, and on the population as a whole.
The rapid incorporation of genetic testing into prenatal care seems to reflect an assumption that it would be an unqualified good to know whether one's fetus is genetically abnormal. Indeed, many women apparently view the tests in this manner, accepting as many as are offered, and terminating their pregnancies when the tests indicate serious abnormalities.'35 At least two significant "eugenic" concerns might be raised about the pace and the manner in which genetic screens and tests have become the standard of care in treating pregnant women. First, l ittle attention has been paid to the information given to women when they consent to be tested and when they learn the results of their tests.'36 Some studies suggest at least some women m ight be confused by the fact that their health care provider is offering a genetic test.I37 Nancy Press's study of California women, for instance, surveyed pregnant women who self-identified as anti-abortion, and yet, consented to the alpha-fetal-protein test.I38 The fact that they underwent such testing was puzzling owing to their convictions against terminating pregnancy, and 'lhirteen T#lys if Looking at Buck v. Bell indeed, Press found that many of these women consented to the test under the mistaken impression that it was "good for their fetus," or "recommended by their doctors. " '39 I t is in thinking about what sort of information should be required for a truly informed consent that one recognizes the complexity posed by these now-routine tests. Consider, for instance, the information given to a woman about her options following a "bad" result after amniocentesis. If her test results indicate that she is carrying a fetus with trisomy 21, or Down syndrome, what sort of information does she need in order to determine whether to terminate her pregnancy? Clearly, the circumstances warrant more than merely a disclosure of the risks of terminating a pregnancy versus carrying a pregnancy to term. But who determ ines the quality and quantity of information disclosed about the implications of trisomy 21 for a child? Will the woman be permitted to meet parents of children with D own syndrome, or the children themselves? Would such meetings, or even the suggestion of such meetings, be considered intrusive and overly paternalistic, smacking, perhaps, of the efforts of anti abortion forces to chill abortion by demanding ultrasounds and speeches as part of "informed consent" to the procedure? And yet, without such information, the individual decision to terminate may be based upon little more than gut level responses to the thought of having a mentally challenged child.'40 At a population level, the eugenic implications of population testing are more readily apparent. I f large numbers of women who undergo testing opt to terminate their pregnancies, there will be fewer babies born with genetic abnormalities. Perhaps this fact will benefit society at an economic level. I ndeed, one might worry that there will be discriminatory consequences for those who elect to carry to term genetically abnormal offspring. These individuals, such as those born with Down syndrome, tend to generate higher than average health care costs. But clearly the decision to diminish the genetic diversity of the human population should be predicated on more than economics. We cannot know the long-term consequences for our population of reducing its diversity in this manner, but it seems the ultimate hubris to assume that, because we cannot be sure it will be harmful, there is no reason not to proceed in altering the course of our population as a whole. Ultimately, the population-based concern collides with concerns about individual autonomy. Nonetheless, it seems clear that those on all sides of the abortion issue should agree that those who receive genetic testing should be provided with the most comprehensive informed consent process.141 C. Theme Thirteen: Disability, Sexuality, and Parenting
The final realm in which I will consider the troubling legacy of eugenics in con temporary culture lies in the manner in which caretakers, empowered by the law, respond to issues of sexuality and reproduction among the mentally disabled. In the Epilogue to his book, Lombardo reviews contemporary practices governing the sterilization of mentally disabled individuals. He concludes that current legal safeguards make it improbable, although not impossible, for government officials to embark upon the sort of broad-scaled sterilization campaigns seen in the early 20th century.
Lombardo observes that current sterilization laws apply to "incompetents," such as the mentally ill or mentally retarded.'42 These laws run the gamut from highly protective of an individual's due process rights to a startling Arkansas law that requires no j udicial review before sterilization.'43 Lombardo questions the state laws that allow parents or legal guardians of the mentally disabled to request "voluntary" sterilizations of their family members or wards.'44 He finds troubling the "extent to which this practice may reflect the same attitudes played out in the Buck case-that the disabled are worthy of contempt and that the social costs such people generate j ustify court orders for unwanted surgery. "145
Although the ongoing practice of permitting the state to order the sterilization of mentally disabled individuals may be seen as a reflection of conventional eugenic notions, it also is the product of a broader set of legal, medical, ethical, and pragmatic concerns. Decisions surrounding sex, pregnancy, and parenting by mentally disabled individuals are complex, and trigger a variety of concerns on the part of their caretakers. Parents, the most common caretakers for mentally disabled adult children, may express a desire to control or limit their child's sexual activity for reasons ranging from personal discomfort with the prospect of their child becoming a sexual being,146 to concerns about their child's capacity to consent to sex, to fear that their child will be unable to raise a child on their own . 147
There is a wide range of abilities among individuals who m ight be termed "mentally disabled."148 In the realm of sexual contact, the relevant legal issues turn on the extent to which an individual is deemed "competent." The legal defi nition of competence is vague, though, and the reality is that one might be competent for some purposes, but not for others. One must begin thinking about competence among the mentally disabled by considering the extent to which the individual is capable of consenting to sexual contact.149 This is necessary because an individual who is competent may make their own decisions about sexual activity and reproduction; if they are incompetent, however, then sexual activity with them is a crime.150 150. I ndeed, one of the problems with the sterilization of mentally incompetent individuals, particularly those at high risk of sexual abuse such as those who are institutionalized, is that in so doing, one may mask the evidence of rape, making it more difficult to prosecute sexual predators who prey on this population.
Sexual actIvIty occurs among the mentally disabled regardless of their capacity to consent. ')' At the same time, research suggests that these individuals are disproportion ally vulnerable to manipulation and coercion'52 and are more likely than the general population to experience sexual assault, although they might not identify it as such . '53 Sexual activity among mentally disabled individuals also triggers concerns that compel the involvement, at least at a preliminary l evel, of medical and legal professionals. Medical experts must evaluate the individual's capacity to consent to sex and to make informed decisions regarding contraception and pregnancy. They must further evaluate the individual's capacity to consent to sterilization, or to make sound decisions regarding prenatal care or abortion. In the event that an individual is incompetent to make these decisions, the law must identify a surrogate decision-maker, appointed to render decisions on that individual's behalf.
Ostensibly, the job of the surrogate decision-maker is to render the decision the individual would have made, were she competent to do so herself. Of course, this task becomes nonsensical when applied to a person who never was competent to begin with.'54 In such cases, the decision-maker's task becomes "objective," and requires determining the course of action deemed to be in the ward's best interests. This process is so established in the medical context of decision-making for a host of incompetent patients that one seldom pauses to question the extent to which one person can ever determine another's real best interests. That some families choose to sterilize a disabled relative for eugenic or self-interested reasons does not mean all families will do so; as Lombardo observes, families often request sterilization of a disabled relative for the noblest of intentions.')5 In the realm of sexuality and reproduction for the mentally disabled, for instance, is it in the individual's best interests to 153. A tragic and famous example is the 1989 "Glen Ridge assault," in which a group of teenage boys lured a mildly retarded teenage girl into a basement where they asked her to perform sexual acts and inserted objects into her vagina. In re B.G., 589 A.2d 637 (1991). The girl did not know what rape was and complied with the boys' requests; she later told a swim teacher about the incident only to ask how to say "no" to such requests in the future. In re B .G., 589 A.2d at 640. 7hirteen Uizys if Looking at Buck v. Bell experience sexuality? To experience pregnancy? To be able to hold her own baby, even if she lacks the skills to raise it on her own? Further complicating the decision-maker's task is the reality that a family member asked to perform the job of surrogate decision-maker may be conflicted about the extent to which her decision regarding her ward has consequences for her own life. Such consequences, Lombardo points out, should not be dismissed lightly, yet neither should they be exclusively dispositive in authorizing the sterilization of the mentally infirm. '56
In addition to these practical and moral concerns, there is reason to believe that eugenics still informs (or misinforms) decisions regarding whether a mentally disabled individual ought to be sterilized, or to undergo an abortion. Although it is evident that some developmental delays and disabilities are genetically transmitted, there is ample evidence demonstrating that parents with severe disabilities can produce healthy, normal children. '57 Furthermore, even if it were the case that all disabled parents produced similarly disabled offspring, it is not necessarily self-evident that this result is a tragedy to be avoided. O ne of the most persistent and perhaps most insidious forms of eugenic-based thinking in contemporary society is the tacit assumption, most often seen in prenatal diagnostic testing, that it is better to avoid the b irth of disabled individuals than to welcome and accommodate them. I do not mean to suggest that pregnant women should be denied access to prenatal diagnostics, but rather that these tests should not absolve society of the duty to make life easier for disabled individuals and their families.
III. Conclusion
There lies a profound sadness at the core of Lombardo's history of the U. S. government's involvement with and support of sterilization. The story he recounts for us is not simply about lawyers, doctors, and policy-makers who collaborated in a misguided effort to promote their vision of progress. It is also about the emotional significance and the value we place upon one's capacity to reproduce. Lombardo's work helps us to recogn ize something that should long have been obvious: policies governing reproduction, whether direct or indirect, refl ect tacit assumptions about the value the state places on the importance of bearing children. More to the point, these various policies demonstrate an enduring sense that, when it comes to the right to enjoy parenthood, some people are more deserving than others.
The words we use to describe the condition of being unable to reproduce seem far too shallow to convey the longing and despair experienced by those who want to have children but who are physically incapable of reproduction. We do not call it "sterility" anymore; one seldom hears someone say: " I am sterile." I nstead, we have optimistically recast it as a medical condition, infertility, which suggests the possibility of treatment and cure, at least for those who can afford it. The truth is, though, that for those who want children but for whatever reason cannot have them, the harsh word "sterile" may come closer to capturing the emotional valence of their reality.
Lombardo forces us to look straight on at Carrie Buck's grief, and at the grief of countless others who were stripped of their right to reproduce. One cannot but feel ashamed and sickened by the governments that s tood in judgment of these individuals and denied them access to what many consider to be one of the most central and transformative of human experiences. It is easy to condemn their actions. But beyond the most obvious cases of governmental abuse of authority lie harder questions about the extent to which there is a fundamental right to be a parent, and whether, if such a right exists, it constricts a government's ability to m ake policies that limit its citizens' free exercise of that right, or indeed, generates affirmative obligations upon a government to assist its citizens in pursuing that right.
